EPC Horn of African Studies Unit
Key Takeaways
- The federal Somali government asserts that the establishment of the new Northeastern State of Somalia stems from the aspirations of local communities and aims to promote national unity. However, both Puntland and Somaliland view this move as an infringement on their traditional spheres of influence, posing threats to their sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- Mogadishu’s sponsorship of the Northeastern State is likely to prompt a response from Puntland and Somaliland. Their reactions may range from rapprochement and cooperation in opposition to the central government, to more radical measures aimed at delegitimizing and dismantling the newly formed state.
- The future of the new state depends on its ability to consolidate itself amid political rivalries and tribal competition. Its greatest challenge will be securing legitimacy and recognition, particularly from other federal Somali entities.
In a remarkable development, an expanded local conference held in Laascaanood in July 2025 announced the formation of Somalia’s sixth federal state – the Northeastern State of Somalia, also known as Khatumo. This newly declared state encompasses the regions of Sool, Sanaag and Ayn, which remain contested by Somaliland and Puntland. These two states have rejected this development, denouncing it as a threat and a strategic maneuver by Mogadishu to reinforce its federal authority. This step risks heightening tensions and deepening political and tribal polarization in a region already plagued by a fragile and complex legal and political environment.
The sixth state and Mogadishu’s calculations
The central government in Mogadishu has maintained strong support for the emerging situation in the northeast. This started with supporting the armed tribal movement led by the Dhulbahante and Warsangali clans in February 2023. The movement gained momentum culminating in the defeat of the Somaliland army in August 2023 and the establishment of the Khatumo administration – a reality Mogadishu provisionally recognized in October 2023.
Further solidifying its support, Mogadishu formally accepted the new administration as a full member of the Somali federation, designating it as the sixth regional state. This decision followed a controversial visit by Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre to Laascaanood, the capital of the new state, in April 2025. Furthermore, the Somali federal government has played a pivotal role in establishing the new state (the northeastern state) and provided it with legitimacy. This marks an important juncture in the history of this region and reflects the aspirations of marginalized communities to reclaim their key historical role in shaping Somalia’s national political framework.
The central government in Mogadishu considers itself the primary beneficiary of this new reality. Its key motives and calculations for redrawing Somalia’s political map include the following:
First, Advancing Centralist Orientations: The rise of the new state contributes to the recalibration of the federal balance of power in favor of the central government. This shift enhances Mogadishu’s weight in shaping national policy and potentially expands its reach over regional states. It also positions Mogadishu to play a decisive role in shaping the political elite of the new federal member (Laascaanood). The new state is expected to align more closely with centralist visions of governance and future power dynamics within Somalia.
Second, Undermining Somaliland’s Secessionist Agenda: Mogadishu and unionist elites in southern Somalia have taken the lead in creating the Northeastern State with the aim of delivering a severe blow to Somaliland’s long-standing bid for independence based on colonial-era borders (the former British Protectorate). The government of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has sensed troubling shifts in international and regional attitudes toward the Somali question, with an increasing interest in Somaliland at the expense of Somalia. Notably, signs of a changing mood in Washington suggest a potential reconsideration of the “One Somalia” policy, raising the possibility of formal recognition for Somaliland.
Figure 1: The Northeastern State of Somalia (Khatumo) and its geographical boundaries as they appear on the map
Third, Curtailing Puntland’s Influence: Mogadishu’s support for Khatumo reflects a desire to empower Laascaanood to chart its own course, independent of Puntland’s agenda. This approach disregards Garowe’s concerns, particularly regarding federal plans to reorganize local forces and militias – formerly affiliated with the Khatumo administration – to integrate them in the federal army. Garowe interprets these moves as a calculated move to alter regional power dynamics and impose federal control. Such changes could reduce Puntland’s territorial scope, reshape its social fabric and limit its ability to maintain influence, autonomy and strategic balance.
Fourth, Pursuing Economic, Geostrategic and Demographic Objectives: The region is believed to hold significant hydrocarbon reserves. It also occupies a key strategic location that enhances the federal state’s access to the Gulf of Aden. This positioning serves as a hedge against potential shifts in international focus toward Somaliland and Puntland, which could undermine Mogadishu’s strategic relevance. Additionally, the cental government may seek to weaken entrenched tribal dynamics which dominate the Somali political landscape by altering the demographic composition in areas dominated by rival clans. This includes challenging the influence of the Isaaq and Darood clans in Hargeisa and Garowe, respectively, while reinforcing the position of the Hawiye clan, to which President Sheikh Mohamud and most of the elites in the center belong.
Fifth, Conveying Messages to the International Community and Somalia’s Partners: Through its actions, Mogadishu aims to project growing confidence in its ability to manage both internal and external affairs independently. In return, it expects foreign actors to recognize and engage with the federal government as the legitimate authority that is capable of guiding Somalia out of its prolonged crises. This includes asserting control over constitutional reforms, managing the relationship between the center and the peripheries and setting the terms for foreign cooperation with Somaliland and other regional states.
Somaliland and Puntland’s positions and options
Somaliland and Puntland share common concerns regarding the fate of disputed territories, particularly Sool, Sanaag and Ayn. Somaliland has firmly rejected the creation of the Northeastern State on territories it considers “under its jurisdiction.” Hargeisa views this move as an attempt by Mogadishu to exert political influence through tribal affiliations, potentially inciting internal conflict. It also sees the development as part of a broader strategy to undermine its authority, destabilize its governance and derail its aspirations for international recognition as an independent state.
Similarly, Puntland has strongly opposed this development and pledged to confront it. Garowe perceives the move as a direct threat to its territorial integrity and political authority. It accuses the Federal Government of Somalia of complicity in fragmenting the country. Puntland officials have warned that “the federal government is attempting to divide the nation into conflicting regional entities.”
This situation may prompt both Hargeisa and Garowe to consider possible responses, ranging from reconciliation and collaboration in confronting the central government, to more aggressive actions to challenge the legitimacy of the new administration and dismantle it.
1. Reconciliation and Strategic Alignment: Despite the tension and rivalry that have characterized the relationship between the two stable neighboring regions – Somaliland and Puntland – over the past 30 years, the current crisis may present an opportunity for them to reconcile and collaborate. Recent developments suggest a potential shift in attitudes, which could strengthen their positions and complicate the central government’s efforts to assert control over the disputed territories. A united front could reshape the political landscape and challenge the federal government’s ambitions in the region.
2. Operational Escalation and Strategic Encirclement: Somaliland may view the situation as a window for decisive military action aimed at recapturing the city of Laascaanood and surrounding areas, dismantling its opponents’ presence and halting their progress toward federal integration. Puntland, meanwhile, is unlikely to remain passive in the face of such escalation by Hargeisa against Laascaanood. It could potentially find itself in conflict with the latter, particularly if the new administration crosses the boundaries set by President Said Deni, which include attempts to extend its administrative reach into areas still under Puntland’s control, including the Sanaag region.
3. Negotiation and Diplomatic Engagement: This remains the most viable path for resolving Somalia’s current political deadlock. International mediation and support could help facilitate a broader dialogue addressing key issues such as the constitutional crisis and the legal status of the new administration. However, entrenched positions and deep-seated mistrust among Somali stakeholders continue to hinder progress toward peace and reconciliation. For instance, Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro has emphasized that talks with Mogadishu cannot proceed until concerns over sovereignty violations and the establishment of a separate administration are addressed. This suggests that any revival of negotiations between northern and southern Somalia would require a shift in Mogadishu’s approach.
The consequences of the creation of the New State and its future
The establishment of the new Northeastern Somalia state carries significant implications for the country’s future. It comes at a time of political uncertainty, persistent security challenges and financial strain, compounded by declining external support due to changing priorities among donors. The federal government and its supporters view the new state as a means to enhance national unity, peace, stability and development by integrating regions into the federal framework. However, Puntland and Somaliland view the initiative as a threat to their traditional spheres of influence and sovereignty, prompting strong opposition and resistance to any redrawing of Somalia’s political and administrative map.
Meanwhile, public sentiment across Somalia is marked by a mix of anticipation and cautious optimism. Some view the development as an opportunity to strengthen and expand the federal model and rebuild Somali federalism on the principles of equitable partnership and national unity. Others fear it may further complicate Somalia’s already intricate political dynamics, potentially escalating tensions and conflict both in the region and the country as a whole. Domestic and international stakeholders remain hopeful that these significant changes will prompt meaningful political dialogue among all Somali parties and stakeholders to forge consensus and chart a stable path forward.
The success of the new administration hinges on its ability to establish itself within a politically charged environment rife with tribal rivalries. It faces considerable hurdles in establishing functioning executive and legislative institutions, securing financial and logistical support and ensuring basic security. Most critically, it must gain recognition and legitimacy, especially from other federal entities, amid a lack of consensus at both regional and federal levels. Without garnering sufficient acceptance from neighboring states, the administration risks remaining a symbolic entity.
Even at the local level, the new federal entity still lacks inclusivity, cohesion and effective control over all the territories it claims to represent. Skepticism persists among certain tribal groups, especially the Warsangli clan, about fair representation. In the Sanaag region, divisions remain between supporters of the new entity and others who maintain allegiance to Puntland’s political and administrative structures. These tribal and regional contradictions pose significant obstacles to consolidating loyalty and building a unified governance framework.
Summary and conclusions
The declaration of a new state in the Khatumo region of northeastern Somalia has sparked political controversy and deepened divisions among the Somali population. Reactions from the federal government, Somaliland and Puntland reflect growing tensions and competing visions for Somalia’s future. The disputed region’s strategic importance is likely to grow as tribal competition and regional polarization intensify, further complicating the already fragile situation in the country.
Despite the initial enthusiasm from supporters and strong opposition from rivals, the emerging administration faces numerous challenges on its path toward full federal integration. Addressing its fragile legitimacy will require expanding its representative base, resolving tribal divisions, securing both governmental and external support, improving security and living conditions and gaining recognition from other members of the Somali Federation, particularly Puntland. Additionally, mitigating potential threats from Somaliland will be essential to ensuring the stability and viability of the new state.
Editor’s Note: This op-ed was first published by the Emirates Policy Center (EPC), an independent think tank based in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.
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